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1. Introduction 
With 50 million metric tons of e-waste disposed worldwide each year, e-waste recycling has 
become an increasingly important issue globally. China alone adds 2 million tons of e-waste 
and the number increases at a rate of more than 10% each year (Ni, 2007). American 
consumers replace their mobile phones every one and half years on average (Grow, 2008), 
producing 130 million discarded cell phones annually nationwide (Hanselman, 2007). In 
China, 70 million mobile phones and 10 million PCs are being discarded each year (NDRC1, 
2006). Likewise, more than 50 million PCs are disposed in the U.S. each year (Hung, 2007), 
with this number accounting for only 10% of the disposable computers. The majorities of 
defunct computers are not being used and simply collect dust (Zhong, 2009).  
Along with the execution of policies and regulations for e-waste recycling, the Chinese 
National Development and Reform Commission have launched four national pilot projects in 
four major cities including Hangzhou, Qingdao, Beijing and Tianjin since 2004 (NDRC2). The 
objectives of the pilot projects include: setting up a network for e-waste collection, supporting 
the development of standards and regulations for e-waste management, and developing key 
technologies as well as equipment for Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) 
recycling (Yu, 2010, Streicher, 2007). Despite the advanced equipment and technologies 
supporting the pilot projects, the effect of these pilots was only minimal due to the high cost 
involved. While typical recycling companies are challenged because of the shortage of 
supplies, lacking efficient incentive has become a bottleneck of e-waste recycling in China. 
To find the best solution to the e-waste recycling issue in China, this research carefully 
considers and examines recycling models such as Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR), 
Online Recycling System and the existing Deposit-refund System. After weighing pros and 
cons of each, it is concluded that we need to explore a new approach under EPR to best suit 
China’s socio-economic situation. We then combine and tailor the concepts of the 3 above-
mentioned systems based on China’s situation, and proposed a customized deposit-refund 
system under EPR structure with the facilitation of online information technology. With the 
deposit-refund system under EPR, it is much easier to increase consumers’ incentives to 
recycle and accordingly ensure the construction of a formal recycling channel.  
Surrounding the proposed deposit-refund System under EPR, this research carefully 
analyzes the correlative monetary, information and product flow for China’s e-waste special 
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fund administration and tries to apply closed-loop supply chain optimization theory to 
design an expense allocation incentive mechanism that helps make all parties participate the 
recycling process and track the environment effect. Focusing on the issues of recycling, 
environmental effects and incentives, and re-evaluation of the appropriate roles of the 
government, this research provides a new perspective on supply chain analysis. Based on 
Savasakan’s supply chain model, we refer the deposit parameter as a new parameter, and 
then examine the global supply chain from the angle of total social welfare and environment 
impact. Lastly, in this research, we try to define and introduce the quantitative and 
standardization theory, which will greatly enrich and complement the existing recycling 
theory system for future study. 
2. Review of alternative recycling systems 
2.1 EPR system 
EPR (Extended Producer Responsibility) is defined as “a policy principle to promote total 
life-cycle environmental improvements of product systems by extending the responsibilities 
of the manufacturer of the product to various parts of the entire life-cycle of the product, 
and especially to the take-back, recycling and final disposal of the product” (Lindhqvist, 
1999). EPR requests producers to take responsibility and minimize its negative 
environmental impacts from designing recyclable products in the first phase (eco-design) to 
collecting those to be disposed at the end of the products’ useful lives (Zhong, 2009). 
Furthermore, it avoids “everyone’s responsibility is no one’s responsibility” because it sets 
forth the overall “polluter pays” principle. As an environmental legislation, EPR has 
provided a new means to clarify responsibility implementation through administrative, 
economic, and informational instruments. The concept of EPR was first formally introduced 
in Sweden. In 2000, the European Parliament passed a directive requiring its member 
countries to institute an EPR program for EOL vehicles (Forslind K.H, 2005) and an 
additional directive for WEEE was approved in early 2003. Other countries, such as Japan 
has also enacted an EPR law covering four large electrical home appliances (Spicer A, 2004). 
The United States established a similar system with a variation of focusing more on product 
responsibility, instead of product. Table 1 shows the definition and explanation of EPR 
under respective legislations. 
The ultimate goal of controlling e-waste is minimizing the impact of end-of-lifecycle (EOL) 
products on the environment. Scholars have explored the practices of EPR in different 
regions and across different products. They reached a consensus recognizing that EPR 
policies can actually stimulate product innovation and environment-friendly design in 
reducing materials, resources and energy usage by eliminating the use of toxins, extending 
the useful life cycle, increasing opportunities for recovery and re-use of the product at end-
of-life (Scott N., 2007,Tojo N., 2001). But all of that is under the condition of higher economic 
development level, the execution force of legislation and active and positive involvement 
from consumers. In this model, consumers’ incentives to recycle disposed items to a great 
extent depend on their voluntary will and their sense of responsibility to comply their duties 
under the EPR legislation. However, in China, pure constraint from legislation alone does 
not form enough motivation for consumers to perform their duty in recycling process and it 
is practically hard to ensure the full execution of legislation.   
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Hazardous 
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Home Appliance 
Recycling Law 
20 states now have laws 
for discarded electronic 
products that require 
producers to finance or 
manage collection and 
responsible recycling  
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Collection, recycling, 
disposal and 
charging the fee 
Complete recycling 
rate index 
 
In EPR system, producer, 
supplier and customer 
take on responsibility for 
the environmentally 
appropriate disposal of e-
waste  
Consumer 
Pay the recycling fee 
and insure the 
integrity of e-waste 
Inform the retailer 
when home 
appliances retire 
Government 
Pay a part of fee of 
collection, 
disposable or make 
policy of fiscal 
subsidies of EPR 
organization 
Enforce legislation 
Table 1. Definition and legislation of EPR in Europe, Japan and U.S. 
On Feb. 25th, 2010, Chinese government promulgated “Regulation of Management of the 
Recycling and Disposal of Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment” and it has taken 
effect as of January 1st, 2011. This scheme, quoting EPR’s concept, proposes to establish 
special fund contributed by producer, retailer and consumer who are responsible for 
environment prevention and assisting e-waste recycling. However, it will still be a critical 
issue to enforce this finance system in real practice in the future if the problems of high cost 
and lack of incentives are not solved.  
2.2 Online recycling system 
Some scholars proposed a third-party system (Spicer A, 2004, Zhong, 2009). Under this 
model, Zhong introduced the concept of an online recycling system in China (Zhong, 2010). 
This online recycling system focuses on building an e-commerce platform to collect and 
analyze recycling date in real time. Similar to forward logistic shopping website, it only 
provides recycling related services. With this system, a consumer will only need to submit 
the e-waste information including the product category, brand, model, purchase date, 
current condition and etc. via the internet or over the phone. The system will then 
automatically generate a list of the items to be recycled, which will be picked up by 
professionals from a third-party recycler. After the transaction, third-party recycler pays the 
consumer via internet or in cash as compensation. The e-waste will then be transferred to an 
e-waste recycling center, a third firm dedicated to recovering reusable materials from EOL 
products and selling them in second-hand markets. Once it has been delivered to the 
recycling center, the e-waste will first be inspected to determine whether it should be 
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repaired or disassembled. Repaired products can be sold in second-hand markets, while 
disassembled EOL products will be segregated into reusable, recyclable, and disposable 
materials, with each sent to its appropriate inventory. The reusable and recycling 
components are tested for their usability potential before they are sent to a producer or 
retailer, and the disposable components are sent to the disposal site. At the same time, the 
government and producers will provide financial support to recycling center to realize the 
EPR principle. This system is fast, convenient and can be easily spread once established, but 
it needs an original power to push this huge e-commerce recycling market and a series of 
policies and assessment methods such as LCA theory to support the system operation. It 
requires high capacity for recycling and dispatching and also needs the consistent 
participation from all consumers and a high reward to the participated consumers. With 
China’s current economic level, and the fact that civic recycling consciousness hasn’t been 
widely established throughout the whole nation, without enough recycling compensation, 
establishing such a big and complete system can be a long term task and needs us to seek an 
effective means to achieve it in gradual steps. 
2.3 Deposit-refund system in the World 
For most pollutants, the standard response of economists is to tax the offending activity. 
However, a direct tax is not easy to impose on dumping or litter, therefore, an effective 
alternative is to apply the deposit-refund system (DRS) (Don Fullerton, 2000). With DRS, 
consumers pay deposits when they purchase items and get refund when they return the 
items for recycle. 
Take beverage container recycling system in United States as an example. Bottle bills require 
deposits on beverage containers, such as bottles and cans, at the time of purchase. These 
deposits can be totally or partially recovered by individuals who recycle these containers. 
When a retailer buys beverages from a distributor, a deposit is paid to the distributor for 
each can or bottle purchased. The consumer pays the deposit to the retailer when buying the 
beverage. When the consumer returns the empty beverage container to the retail store, to a 
redemption center, or to a reverse vending machine, the deposit is refunded. The retailer 
recoups the deposit from the distributor, plus an additional handling fee in most U.S. states. 
The handling fee, which generally ranges from one to three cents, helps cover the cost of 
handling the containers (Yeh, Chiou-nan, 2008).  
The beverage container recycling program in the United States is an important 
representative of a successful deposit-refund system. The system encourages consumers to 
return beverage containers by providing a refund on the deposit, and is considered by many 
stakeholders as a successful recycling program to be expanded as a federal policy (U.S. 
GAO, 2006). The eleven states (California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Oregon and Vermont) employing this system have 
achieved higher recycling rates and have recycled more beverage containers than the other 
39 states combined (DOC, 2007). The refund value of the container (usually 5 or 10 cents) 
provides a monetary incentive to return the container for recycling (Ramzy, 2008).  
Similarly, container deposit legislation is widespread in many countries in the world, such 
as Australia, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
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Finland, United Kingdom, and etc. Even in China, you can find the reverse vending 
machines that recycle beverage bottle or can and returns 5-10 cents as refund. However, it 
only provides a channel to encourage consumers’ return behaviors.  
Although some enterprises and organizations oppose the deposit system, government may 
pass container deposit legislation for following reasons: 
 To encourage recycling and complement existing curbside recycling programs 
 To recycle plastic PET (Polyethylene Terephthalate), aluminums that may create more 
economic value.  
 To specifically reduce beverage container litter that pollutes the environment. 
 To provide an economic incentive to control and govern environment pollution 
 The system is in fact a significant source of income to some individuals and non-profit 
civic organizations  
To summarize, Deposit-refund System can help consumers prevent from polluting the 
environment. It can also help fund environmental programs and cover the costs of 
processing returned containers with redeemed capital. 
Not limited to beverage area, researchers proposed deposit application in many other fields 
such as e-waste, battery and auto industries and etc. In recycling area of WEEE, Ramzy tried to 
establish an e-market for e-waste returned deposit in the US competitive culture context 
(Ramzy, 2008). For China, Yu proposed a deposit system with shared responsibility to 
incentivize consumer participation (Yu, 2010) and He (He, 2010) developed a recycling 
program by constructing deposit refund scheme in battery recovery. However, neither 
provided elaboration on the detailed implementation of the system.  
Through the above introduction, we find that EPR system emphasizes producer’s 
responsibility and requires producer’s participation. It is most feasible for developed 
countries with high socio-economic level and good sense of responsibility from consumers. 
The fact that China’s economic development is still at a lower level and all consumers 
haven’t built up a relatively good sense of responsibility dictates we cannot directly apply 
the EPR model without customization in China. We need to, instead, seek economic 
incentives and meanwhile constrain consumers’ behavior in order to achieve a satisfying 
recycling effect. 
Online Recycling System, similarly, fully operates on government and producer, but still 
cannot address the issue of lacking incentives from consumers. Its convenient online process 
may help encourage consumers to recycle, but still does not provide enough fund to boost 
up consumers’ incentives. Besides, having all procedures online requires high cost and 
establishment of a series of surrounding systems to complete the process, such as 
assessment system and reverse logistic system and etc. Again, China’s current recycling 
market lacks original motive to push this system to form the scale.  
The existing Deposit-refund system works well in beverage products and does effectively 
motivate consumer to recycle disposed products. But if applied to electrical and electronic 
products without any other measures, it may not work as effectively as for beverage 
products, for e-waste products are different from beverage containers and they require 
www.intechopen.com
 
Post-Consumer Waste Recycling and Optimal Production 156 
more complicated process and demand more resources to recycle and reuse. Deposit 
alone may not be powerful enough to push the recycling process through. We still need 
producer’s involvement to improve products’ design to reduce source of pollution, extend 
the products’ life cycle, and increase opportunities for recovery and re-use of the 
products. 
Based on all analysis above, we propose a Deposit-refund System Under EPR, that 
integrates concepts from the three models and works best with China’s socio-economic 
situation. This system takes account of economic measures and in an eased-up way 
delegates the recycling responsibility to consumers.  It also incorporates the concept of EPR 
by having producers control and improves the design of the products from the beginning 
phase. It facilitates the process with certain online platforms and enforces the constraint of 
consumers’ behavior with the regulations of deposit funds. With the current established 
“home appliance replacements” system, consumers who contact local recycling company 
will receive pick-up service and qualify for a direct price reduction when buying the new 
appliances with vouchers from the company, however, the subsidy comes from National 
and local finance, in this context, the deposit system under EPR is reasonably more cost 
effective and practically easier to implement in China. 
3. E-waste deposit system under EPR 
Although EPR system operates very well in western countries, one big obstacle to the 
adoption of EPR initiatives appears to be the establishment of the fee structure to address 
the costs involved in e-waste collection, disposal, and management. Take the U.S. for 
example, nineteen of the twenty states that have passed the e-waste legislation are adopting 
producer’s responsibility, which requires manufactures and vendors to pay for the recycling 
costs and also provide free recycling to consumers. On the opposite, California switched 
such financial burden to the consumers (consumer responsibility), charging a $6 to $10 
disposal fee on every computer and television purchased (Hanselman, 2007). An often seen 
dilemma is that producers are not willing to pay for recycling because such costs, very 
likely, were not being considered in the initial pricing model, on the other hand, consumers 
are reluctant to take such responsibility because in some states, there are still options to 
trash e-waste for free, or they may choose not to recycle at all. 
Therefore it is necessary to introduce EPR implementation forms, which can be classified 
into three major approaches: voluntary, mandatory and economic. In terms of capital 
operation, in Europe, Korea and Taiwan, all funds come from the producers; while in 
Japan, the capital comes from the consumer. On the other side, the United States 
emphasizes more on economic benefits rather than legislation. Based on the situations in 
China, the authors believe that China should pay more attention on economic methods to 
design the expense mechanism with enough incentive to get all stakeholders participate in 
e-waste recycling. 
As mentioned above, China has enforced the “Regulation of Management of the Recycling and 
Disposal of Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment”, the counterpart of the EU WEEE 
Directive in EPR system and very important for the establishment of an entire management 
framework for e-waste recycling in China (Liu, 2006). Following EPR principle, the regulation 
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stipulates that e-waste should be collected by multiple channels and recycled intensively by 
manufacturers of WEEE. A special fund has been set up. The producer and the importer of 
electronic products shall perform their duty in making contributions to fund for e-waste 
recycling (Yu, 2010). Given this context and reference to Ramzy’s model of e-market for 
deposit-refund (Ramzy, 2008), we propose a deposit recycling system that emphasizes on 
incentive collection, at the same time establishing a competitive market for reuse and recycling 
services, and ensuring all stakeholders to get involved in this system. This special fund should 
be managed by a special non-profit organization (a foundation) under the supervision of the 
government and the capital should come from three sources: consumer’s deposit in advance, 
manufacture’s recycling disposal fees and government’s subsidy. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, we proposed an e-waste deposit recycling system under EPR, 
called Recycling Fund Administration System. It consists of recycling fund and the fund 
administration information system. When consumer purchases a new product, he/she must 
pay a deposit to retailer, who transfers the deposit to the foundation and then receives a 
variable portion when consumer returns unwanted e-products to the third-party recycling 
company directly or via “home appliance replacements” system. The non-profit 
organization and the third-party recycling company are the crucial key to the proposed e-
waste deposit recycling system. 
Further questions we should take into account when implementing this deposit system 
include: 1) How to allocate the contribution to the funding? 2) How to stimulate producer to 
realize their duties? What measures should be taken to provide enough incentive? 
 
Fig. 1. E-waste deposit recycling system Under EPR 
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3.1 Monetary flow  
To simplify the graphical presentation, we only draw the recycling related monetary flow in 
this framework, which starts at the point of sale with consumer’s payment of the deposits. 
Then the deposit is transferred by retailer to the foundation, from which the third-party 
recycling company receives subsidies as reward. The amount varies depending on their 
processing capability and scalability. When consumer returns his/her unwanted products, 
he/she has choices to select recycling companies and receive the refund. In the meantime, to 
abide by the EPR principle, manufacturers and government also need to pay partial of the 
recycling fee to maintain the foundation’s operation. 
More details should be covered outside this paper by further research regarding the 
operations and the management of the deposit system, such as how much manufacturers 
should pay and how to collect and use the fund; how to determine the amount of the 
deposit fee; when should recycling companies get subsidy and how to control all recycling 
flow and manage fund. 
3.2 Information flow 
Fund administration throughout the deposit system should rely on advanced information 
technology. Based on the internet platform, the Fund Administration Information System 
(FAIS) ensures that all information transfers smoothly. Obviously, new electronic product sale 
system should connect with FAIS when the trade happens. Once consumer wants to return old 
products, he/she should submit information through two channels – the replace system or 
contacting FAIS directly. If consumer uses Replacement system of Household Electrical 
Appliances, he/she can input product information through replacement system which 
connects to FAIS. Since China has issued Implementation Measures on Replacement of 
Household Electrical Appliances (also called “home appliance replacements ”system) and has 
already established the recycling database, we can utilize or modify previous information 
systems rather than rebuilding new ones and save money and resources. If consumer does not 
purchase new product or there is no replace system nearby, he/she can log into the FAIS 
website or make phone calls directly to select recycling company to collect their old devices. In 
the return process, the old electronic product information such as product make, model and 
year, and consumer’s information such as pick-up address or contact, etc. should be inputted 
to FAIS. FAIS creates a unique code to track each returned product. Meanwhile, the recycling 
company can give feedback on the level of difficulty of the product disposal and the volume of 
recycling as an evaluation index of EPR performance of the producer, who also has access to 
this information. The FAIS’s another function is to publish an annual report to ensure the use 
of specific funding transparent to public.  
3.3 Product flow 
In the close-loop supply chain, the forward product flow starts from the manufacture. To 
simplify the process, we do not consider the intermediate suppliers and products directly 
transferred to the retailer and then sold to consumer. When a consumer decides to discard 
the old equipment, he/she could select a disposal company by comparing different offers 
from the competitive recycling market. According to the signed agreement between the 
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consumer and the disposal company, consumer can freely choose the channel to deliver 
unwanted product. The returning channel can function in two ways. One way is through the 
original replacement system channel. It integrates forward and reverse shipping system into 
one, delivers new product to consumer’s location, collects the old returned equipment of the 
consumer and then finally ships the old equipment to a local collect point where recycling 
company can pick up later or directly send to recycling company warehouse. This is a way 
that can save transportation cost and increase logistics efficiency. The other way is through 
the FAIS channel. Consumer logs into FAIS, submits product information online such as 
pick-up address, prints the pre-paid shipping label of the recycling firm and drops the 
product to the shipping company or post office. The deliver policy will differ depending on 
the competitive recycling company. 
4. Design of expense mechanism under e-waste recycling closed-loop supply 
chain with deposit system 
4.1 Summary of recycling pricing coordination mechanism based on supply chain 
optimization 
Utilizing closed-loop supply chain optimization method can help make the mechanism 
design efficient, establish reasonable price strategies, allocate profits and coordinate all 
process with all recycling stakeholders having enough participation incentives. Among 
the recent closed-loop supply chain researches, Savaskan’s studies were widely quoted. 
In his theory, closed-loop supply chain was divided into four models: concentrate 
coordination, manufacturer collection, retailer collection and third party collection. The 
four models, in general, can be summarized into 2 categories: decentralized and 
centralized decision-making models (Savaskan, 2004). Most researches apply 
Stackelberg’s sequential game model and compare the different decision models’ 
efficiency of supply chain based on revenue-expense sharing contract and coordinating 
mechanism of all stakeholders’ interests. Since collection model and supply chain’s 
structures are distinct, different portfolio models were developed by various scholars in 
the past, as shown as table 2. Additionally, based on Hammod’s theory, Wang (2010) 
comprehensively considered the behavior of the supplier, the manufacturer, the retailer, 
the demand market and the collector, established the variational inequality models and 
then developed a remanufacture closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium model. 
All the researches listed above concentrated on supply chain interest allocation and 
coordination, but government environmental decision and consumer impetus of 
participation recycling were seldom referred. In particular, the EPR perspective on cost 
incentive mechanism related studies was very much lacked. Therefore, it is necessary to 
extend the research from two aspects. One is to consider government policy maker and 
focus on environment effects to come up with optimum strategy. The other is to inspire 
consumer through deposit system to ensure collection effect.  
4.2 Savaskan’s closed-loop supply chain model by third party collecting 
In the original closed-loop supply chain model, Savasakan not only considered 3rd party 
collecting model (in short 3P model), also compared centrally coordinated system,  
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Recycling 
model 
SC  
structure 
Centralized Decentralized 
Integrated SC 
Design Models
Manufacturer 
collection 
Retailer collection Third party 
collection 
2-tier supply 
chain  
Most of 
reference focus 
on comparison 
between 
centralized 
and 
decentralized 
decision 
Comparison 
between 
manufacturer 
participating 
channel, not 
participating 
channel and 
integrated SC 
(Wang,2007) 
Manufacturer and 
retailer recycling 
pricing 
equilibrium 
(Ge,2008) 
Stackelberg and 
Nash equilibrium 
cooperation 
(Gu,2005,Ye,2007) 
Pricing of close-
loop SC 
considering 
market 
segmentation 
(Wang,2009) 
Retailer selling 
and third-party 
collecting 
(Guo,2007) 
Manufacturer 
and recycler 
games on 
random 
collection 
quantity and 
capacity 
constraints (Sun, 
2008) 
 
Comparison between retailer and 
third-party collector (Wang,2010) 
Summarize and compare three recycling models 
(Fleischmann, 2003, Savaskan,2004, Yao, 2003) 
3-tier supply 
chain  
Manufacturers, repair center and retailer’s price incentives, Stackerlberg 
and Nash model comparison (Huang, 2009), Retailer and third-party joint 
collection, manufacturer, retailer and third-party coordinate pricing by 
sharing responsibility according revenue and cost share (Zhang, 2010) 
Table 2. Summary of Recycling Pricing Coordination Mechanism Based on Supply Chain 
Optimization 
manufacturer collecting and retailer colleting system. Among the above models, the 3P 
collecting model as an alternative approach where private companies assume the EOL 
responsibilities for products on behalf of the original equipment manufacturers and relieves 
both manufacturers and the general public from the responsibilities and is a promising 
approach in optimizing product design, specialization, immediate economic feedback and 
remanufacturing market development (Dan, 2008, Huang, 2006, Spicer, 2004, Xia, 2007, 
Zhang, 2007, Zhong, 2009). Since Savaskan’s model is most widely adopted, we will focus 
on it in this research, as shown in Figue2.  
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Fig. 2. Closed-loop supply chain system framework with deposit system 
Below is a list of notations for Savaskan’s Closed-loop Supply Chain Model. 
p  unit retail price 
w  unit wholesale price ܿ௠ unit cost of manufacturing a new product ܿ௥  unit cost of remanufacturing a returned product into a new one, assuming c௠ > ܿ௥ ∆  unit cost saving from reuse ∆= ܿ௠ − ܿ௥ 
A  fixed payment given to the consumer who returns a used product ܥ௅ scaling parameter 
b  unit transfer price 
(b) the return rate function of used products from the customers which is the expression of 
the transfer price 
D(p) demand for the new product in the market  
D(p) =	߶ − ߚ݌, with ߶ and ߚ being positive and ߶ > ߚܿ௠ 
Πj profit function for channel member j, jϵ{M,R,3P} which denotes the manufacturer, the 
retailer and the third party  
In this 3P model, for a given transfer price b of a used product, the third party maximizes his 
profits to determine the investment in used-product collection and decides the return rate  
(see Equation1).  
 maxτΠ3P=ܾ߬ሺ߶ − ߚ݌ሻ − ܥ௅߬ଶ − ܣ߬ሺ߶ − ߚ݌ሻ (1)	
Retailer solves for price p(w) as a function of the wholesale price set by the manufacturer(see 
Equation 2).  
 max௣ Πୖ = ሺ݌ − ݓሻሺ߶ − ߚ݌ሻ (2) 
The manufacturer sets the wholesale price w of the product to Equation (3) 
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 	max௪ Πெ = ሺ߶ − ߚ݌ሻ[ݓ − ܿ௠ + ሺ∆ − ܾሻ߬] (3) 
For more detailed and complete model explanations please see Savaskan’s paper (Savaskan, 
2004). 
4.3 The new closed-loop supply model with deposit system 
Based on Savaskan’s model, our new model has following changes (See Figure 2). Fistly, 
considering deposit impact for return rate, given d is the deposit of used product, we 
redefine the return rate function to (b,d). Secondly, we concern more about total supply 
chain impact when considering the government decision, which accordingly indicates an 
addition of government function with environment effect.  
Through a survey study we can draw a reaction function of deposit change on consumer 
return wish and then identify the effect on collection rate (b,d). The deposit payment d as 
new parameter entering the closed-loop supply chain system model plays a key role in the 
new optimization supply chain model. We should firstly evaluate different deposit payment 
formats, for instance, a fixed fee or a proportion of the product’s price, and then compare 
how different payment methods of the deposit can influence the rate of collection and cost 
of recycling. We can use statistical methods and estimate parameters to design a reasonable 
function to represent the model. Based on the comparison result of different combinations of 
different approaches and parameters, we can optimize the deposit parameters design in 
closed-loop supply chain system. 
Then we will consider the government decision in closed-loop supply chain that indicates 
an additional game stage. Government’s function should be clarified to satisfy the 
optimization of manufacture, recycler and consumer and minimize negative impacts on the 
human environment. For this reason, based on Savaskan’s closed-loop supply chain system, 
we could realize global supply chain optimization by applying the Stackelberg model and 
maximizing the government utility function, which could be expressed by total social 
welfare with environment index.  
The government solves the deposit d in utility function as follows (see Equation 4): 
 	maxௗሺΠெ + Πୖ +Π3P +ΠC + Eሺ߬ሻሻ (4) ΠC indicates the consumer's surplus and E(߬) is the environment index, the function of 
return rate.  
At the same time, we should compare all stakeholders’ interests and supply chain revenue 
under third party collection in the following situations: 1) whether the government concerns 
environment or not; 2) whether consumer pays deposit or not; 3) whether manufacturer 
pays recycling foundation or not; 4) whether manufacturer and consumer pay all together or 
separately. Accordingly, we can make sure that whether deposit system is practicable and 
know better how to share the responsibility between producer and consumer.  
5. Contributions, limitations and future research 
To address the serious issue of e-waste recycling in China, after comparing the different 
recycling systems in the world, this paper proposes to establish a deposit refund system 
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under EPR framework suitable to China by providing a clear definition on information, 
product and monetary flow under the prevailing EPR policy and applying closed-loop 
supply chain optimization theory. Referring a deposit parameter into supply chain system 
and at the same time considering the government environment decision, we revise the 
Savaskan’s supply model trying to design an expense allocation incentive mechanism 
under closed-loop supply chain optimization theory to have all parties participate the 
recycling process and track the environmental impact. In addition, it provides the 
quantitative and standardization theory to manage China’s e-waste special fund 
administration. Besides the deposit system the paper also provides another glance of an 
alternative third-party recycling system that uses the e-commerce information platform to 
collect and analyze recycling data in real time, and therefore optimizes the design of the 
supply chain. However, we only give a rough model to solve this optimization problem 
since the deposit quantitative effect and environment index in government utility function 
are not clear. Besides, our model is limited to 3rd party collection, and we need to discuss 
more channels collecting to find the best solution. All these questions need to be analyzed 
in the future. 
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